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Abstract
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative
information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking
option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types’, and thus distinguish
‘conformists’ from ‘counter-conformists’, and unconditional choosers. Unconditional choosers
make up the greatest proportion of types (about 80%) while only about 20% of subjects
condition their responses to social information. We find that both conformity and counterconformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization’ dimension of moral
identity). The main difference is that, conformity is also driven by a sensitivity to what others
think (‘attention to social comparison’). Unconditional giving (about 30% of players) on the
other hand is mainly driven by the centrality of moral identity to the self (the ‘internalization'
dimension of moral identity). Social information thus seems to mainly affect those who care
about being seen to be moral. The direction of effect however depends on how sensitive one is to
what others think.

Key words: dictator game with ‘taking’; social information; conformity; anti-conformity;
heterogeneity; redistribution

JEL classification: C91, C72, D31, D64, D91
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1. Introduction
Understanding whether people’s behaviour is influenced by information about what other people
have done in a similar context has fascinated generations of economists, psychologists, and
sociologists, who have explored this question for decades and from several angles (Asch, 1951;
Manski, 1993; Bernheim, 1994; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Shang &
Croson, 2009).
The overall pattern of results is that people tend to conform to the behaviour of others, arguably
because this conveys information about what is normal in a given context and can represent a
useful heuristic about how to behave: “if others are doing it, it must be a sensible thing to do”
(Cialdini, 1988). Classic social psychology studies have found that people are influenced by
what others are doing even in neutral, non-social, settings, such as choosing a consumer product
(Venkatesan, 1966) or looking up at the sky (Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz, 1969). In the
domain of social decisions, it has been proposed that people might also conform to avoid social
disapproval and gain acceptance from others (Cialdini & Goldsteim, 2004). In social contexts,
conformity has been observed both when people receive information about the pro-social
behaviour of others and when they receive information about the anti-social behaviour of others.
For example, when people are informed about the average voluntary contribution of other
people, they tend to conform to this contribution (Shang & Croson, 2009; Bicchieri & Xiao,
2009; Chen, Harper, Konstan and Li, 2010). A similar result holds also when people learn about
the anti-social behaviour of others. Social psychology field experiments have found report that
people are more likely to litter in a littered setting, compared to a clean one (Finnie, 1973; Reiter
& Samuel, 1980; Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Along the same lines, economic experiments
using cheating games have found dishonesty to be contagious (Innes and Mitra, 2013; Lauer and
Untertrifaller, 2019).
In recent years, however, it has been observed that information about negative behaviour in
others can also generate counter-conformity, or reactance, among individuals with strong moral
identities. The intuitive logic is that people with strong moral identities seek to avoid feelings of
guilt and shame from failing to defend their moral convictions; by counter-conforming they
maintain a consistent self-concept (Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012; Cialdini & Goldstein,
2004). Evidence for counter-conformity has been provided mainly in the context of controversial
2

moral issues: when people with strong moral convictions are informed that they are in minority,
they tend to strengthen their convictions (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle &
Skitka, 2012; Furth-Matzkin & Sunstein, 2017).
We contribute to this literature by studying conformity and counter-conformity using an
incentivized economic experiment that proto-typically encapsulates the conflict between a
positive, pro-social, action, and a negative, anti-social, action: a dictator game with a taking
option (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). In our setup, dictators can choose to give money to a
recipient, take money from a recipient, or do nothing (neither give nor take). Social information
is provided to the dictator prior to making this allocation decision; specifically, they are informed
that a previous dictator has either given money to a recipient (positive information), taken money
from a recipient (negative information), or neither given nor taken money (neutral information).
Do dictators react to the different pieces of information? If so, do they conform, or do they
counter-conform? And what can we say about the personal characteristics - particularly the
moral identities - of conformists and counter-conformists? Do counter-conformists have stronger
moral identities than other player types? To answer these questions, we collect decisions using
the strategy-method (Brandts & Charness, 2011). This allows us to identify the different
behavioural strategies that people adopt in response to social information, and hence, to
distinguish conformists, counter-conformists and unconditional choosers, based on their
individual responses.
We also examine the influence of two key predictors, the “Attention to Social Comparison
Information” (AT-SCI) scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and the “moral identity” scale (Aquino &
Reed, 2002). We expect the AT-SCI scale to be an important predictor of conformity in our
context, because the scale is meant to measure the extent to which people care about what others
think. Lennox and Wolfe (1984) suggest that individuals who have high degrees of sensitivity to
what others think tend to avoid negative judgments by others by conforming to what others do.
Similarly, we expect the moral identity scale to be another important predictor in our context
because both giving behaviour (Krupka & Weber, 2013; Capraro & Rand, 2018) and counterconformity (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012) have been linked
to several measures of morality. Therefore, we expect that these correlates might help understand
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the personality characteristics of people that are more likely to conform (or counter-conform) in
response to positive (or negative) information about giving (or taking) behaviour of others.

2. Related literature
In the standard ‘dictator game’, the dictator is endowed with a sum of money and has to decide
how much of it, if any, to give to the recipient, who starts the game with nothing. The recipient is
passive and only receives the amount that the dictator decides to give. In the dictator game with a
taking option, the receiver is also provided with an initial endowment which can be unilaterally
taken by the dictator. Dictator games with a taking option were first studied by List (2007) and
Bardsley (2008), who found that, in this context, fewer dictators were willing to transfer money
to recipients than in the standard game.
Previous work on the effect of social information1 on dictators’ behaviour has mainly focused on
standard dictator games, with no taking option. An earlier paper by Cason and Mui (1998)
implemented a sequential dictator game in which dictators made an allocation decision before
and after receiving social information about another dictator. They found that, whereas irrelevant
information led to declines in giving, giving did not change with social information. Bicchieri
and Xiao (2009) found that dictator game donations were affected by information regarding the
most common behaviour of other dictators (descriptive norm) and by information about what
other participants thought it was the most appropriate thing to do (injunctive norm). Krupka &
Weber (2009) found that learning about others’ behaviour increased donations in the dictator
game. Similarly, D’Adda, Capraro and Tavoni (2017) found that informing dictators that about
half of the dictators in a previous experiment had donated half of their endowment or more,
increased dictator game donations. Servátka (2009) however found that providing information
about the behaviour of another dictator did not significantly increase dictator game donations.
Zafar (2011) found that subjects changed their donations in the direction of the descriptive norm
(what others were doing) in a dictator game with a charitable cause as the recipient.

Social information effects are examined in the literature using different names, including “peer effects”, “social
influence”, “neighbourhood effects” and “conformity”.
1
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There is also an extensive literature using field experiments to examine the impact of social
information on donations to charitable causes. For example, Shang & Croson (2009) found that
providing potential donors to a public radio station with information about high contributions by
other donors had a positive effect on contributions. Frey and Meier (2004) found that students
who were informed that 64% of students had donated to a charitable organization were more
likely to donate than students who were informed that 46% of the students had donated. Chen,
Harper, Konstan and Li (2010) found that below-median contributors increased their voluntary
contributions to an online community after being informed about the median contribution of
other users, whereas above median contributors decreased theirs. Goeschl, Kettner, Lohse and
Schwerien (2018) found that donations to a pro-environmental cause were affected by the
descriptive norm. In sum, the previous literature indicates that people mostly tend to conform to
social information regarding the pro-social behaviours of other people.2
There is rather less experimental evidence regarding the impact of negative social information on
behaviour compared to positive social information. The only study to date is an unpublished
work by Eugen Dimant (2019), which uses a dictator game with a taking option and a charitable
cause as the recipient. In this study, players can revise their original contribution decisions to a
charity after learning about the contributions of another player. He finds an asymmetric influence
of social information, with taking/anti-social behaviour having a larger (negative) impact on
average contributions that giving/pro-social behaviour.
More broadly, classic studies in social psychology have uncovered that people are more likely to
litter in a littered setting, compared to a clean one (Finnie, 1973; Reiter & Samuel, 1980;
Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). In the economic literature, the effect of negative social
information on behaviour has been examined using cheating games. Innes and Mitra (2013)
found dishonesty to be contagious: when subjects were informed that the rate of dishonesty in a
population is high, they were more likely to act dishonestly in a sender-receiver game, compared

2

Similar results have been obtained also in behavioural domains other than altruistic giving, such as public goods
contributions (Bardsley, 2000; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2001; Croson, 2007; Shang
& Croson, 2009), effort choices in gift-exchange experiments (Gächter, Nosenzo & Sefton, 2013; Thöni & Gächter,
2015), second- and third-party punishment (Ho & Su, 2009; Fabbri & Carbonara, 2017), trust (Mittone & Ploner,
2011), and, in the field, traffic violation (Chen, Lu and Zhang, 2017).
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to when subjects were informed that the rate of dishonesty is low. Similarly, Lauer and
Untertrifaller (2019) found people to be more likely to lie after seeing a group member lying.
While all of the above studies regard conformity, there is little work on counter-conformity.
Previous work has mainly tested the effect of providing information about a majority opinion
that is contrary to participants’ held beliefs, on attitudes and/or intentions to speak out against the
majority view. Hornsey et al. (2003) found that people with strong moral convictions about a
social issue were more likely to express counter-conformist intentions when they learned that
they were in a minority, whereas those with weaker moral convictions tended to conform to the
majority view. Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka (2012) studied the effect of people’s moral
convictions in resisting conforming to a majority supporting torture. They found that people with
strong moral convictions against torture were more likely to resist conforming. Similarly, FurthMatzkin & Sunstein (2017) observed counter-conformism in response to several governmental
policies, and the extent of counter-conformism was predicted by the extent to which antecedent
opinions on the matter were fixed and firm. In the only study to examine whether people exhibit
counter-conforming behaviour, Hornsey, Smith and Begg (2007) found that, although
participants showed an intention to counter-conform, this resolve disappeared when they were
asked to actually act on it.
Related to our work is also the literature testing the effect of moral preferences on dictator game
donations. Krupka and Weber (2013) found giving behaviour to be partly driven by preferences
for doing what others think is the appropriate thing to do. They also found that not giving was
considered to be less inappropriate than taking, and this helped explain framing effects in the
dictator game when passing from the give frame to the take frame. Capraro and Rand (2018) and
Tappin and Capraro (2018) found dictator game donations to be positively correlated to moral
choices in the so-called Trade-Off game, suggesting that dictator game giving is primarily driven
by preferences for doing what the dictator thinks it is the morally right thing to do. Capraro and
Vanzo (2019) found that moral words in the instructions of the dictator game significantly
impacted dictators’ level of altruism. For example, dictators were less likely to “steal” from the
recipient than to “take”, despite the fact that, in their experimental context, “stealing” and
“taking” had the same economic consequences.
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In summary, evidence from dictator games as well as from field experiments suggest that people
are influenced by what other people do. In the context of redistribution behaviours (i.e. giving
and taking), people tend to conform to social information about positive (pro-social) behaviour
by others; what remains less clear is how people behave in response to negative (anti-social)
behaviour in others. The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how negative social
information affects behaviour compared to positive social information, and to identify how moral
identity influences how different individuals react to positive and negative social information.

3. Experimental Design
We use the dictator game with a taking option, since one of our goals is to examine whether antisocial information generates counter-conformity. To do this requires an action set containing an
action (i.e., taking) that is considered to be socially inappropriate, or anti-social. The fact that
taking in the dictator game is perceived to be socially inappropriate has been shown by Krupka
and Weber (2013). We also test the same hypothesis on our particular sample, and find it
confirmed (see Online Appendix 1).
Hence, we conduct a two-player dictator game with a taking option and with social information,
as follows. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of two players, in which one player is
randomly assigned the role of dictator (player A) and the other assigned the role of ‘recipient’
(player B). Player A receives an endowment of $1.50, while player B receives $0.50. Player A is
then informed that s/he will have the chance to give money, take money, or do neither with
respect to the recipient. The script for player A specifically reads:
"In your group, you have been randomly selected to receive $1.50. You are player A. The
other participant in your group will receive $0.50. This person is player B.
You will now have the chance to give or take some money to/from player B. Specifically, the
choices available to you are:
Take $0.50 from player B /// Neither give nor take to/from player B /// Give $0.50 to player B"
Thus, the options available to player A present thee clear choices: 1) an ‘anti-social’ choice,
whereby the player maximises her own payoffs (by taking all of player B’s endowment), 2) a
7

‘pro-social’ choice, whereby s/he eliminates unequal distributions (by giving $0.50 to player B),
and 3) a ‘neutral’ option, by which she chooses to do nothing.
However, before making this decision, player A is informed she/he has been randomly matched
with another participant (player C) who has previously made a decision playing a similar dictator
game with another recipient, the game Player D. (The decisions of Players C were collected in a
previous experiment3). Player A is then asked to indicate her/his contribution decisions
conditional on each possible contribution decision made by the other player A. Specifically, the
text reads:
“You will be shown each of the other player’s possible decisions. You will then indicate
whether you prefer to give to, take from, or neither give nor take from player B in your group
in response to each possible decision by the other player.”
The reason why we use the strategy method instead of the direct-response method is to be able to
distinguish conformists from counter-conformists and unconditional choosers at the individual
level. The order of presentation of the possible choices made by Player C is sequential and
randomised across all players A. Each time player A receives new information about Player C’s
possible choice (i.e. the social information), she/he must select a contribution choice in response
to each.
Following completion of the distribution task, all players were asked to explain the reason for
their choices using an open-ended explanations format. This was then followed by two
psychological scales intended to measure key variables that are expected to influence choices in
the game: the “moral identity” scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the “attention to social
comparison information” scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984).
The moral identity scale, developed by Aquino and Reed (2002), is used to identify the mental
representation that an individual may have about her/his moral self (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This
construct is developed around key moral ‘traits’ that have been found to strongly predict moral
behaviour (see Aquino & Reed, 2002 for a review of the literature). The reason we add the moral
identity scale is the following. Previous work suggests that giving in the dictator game is partly
driven by preferences for doing what one thinks others think it is socially appropriate (Krupka &
In a prior study we collected data of a baseline game, with no information regarding another participant’s
behaviour. We use this data as Player C in this experiment.
3
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Weber, 2013) and by preferences for doing what one thinks to be the morally right thing to do
(Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018; Capraro & Vanzo, 2019). Therefore, we
expect that both the “importance of being observed to be moral” and the “importance of moral
identity to intrinsic self-image” will affect Player A’s choice. Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral
identity scale allows us to measure both these two motivations, as it consists of two subscales
that distinguish between two dimensions of moral identity: the “internalization” dimension
(which corresponds to the importance of moral identity to intrinsic self-image), and the
“symbolization” dimension (which corresponds to the importance of being observed to be
moral). We also expect that the extent to which Player A responds to information about the
choice of Player C is related to the extent to which Player A cares about being seen as moral.
Therefore, we expect that the moral identity scale, and especially its symbolization dimension, is,
in our experimental context, related to conformity.
The other scale we use - the AT-SCI scale, developed by Lennox and Wolfe (1984) - is used as a
proxy measure of preferences for conformity. This scale specifically measures an individual’s
sensitivity to social comparison. Lennox and Wolfe (1984) suggest that individuals who have
high degrees of sensitivity to what others think (i.e. social comparison) tend to avoid negative
judgments by others. The AT-SCI measure has been found to moderate the influence of norms
on behavioural intentions (Chiou, 1998; Beardon & Rose, 1990) and judgments (Yoon, La Ferle
& Edwards, 2016), such that higher ATSCI individuals are more likely to conform to social
norms or information. Therefore, we expect high scores in the AT-SCI scale to be related to
conformity in our dictator game with information.
We also include some demographic questions. We focus in particular on gender, since previous
analyses suggest that females are more altruistic than males (Engel, 2010; Rand et al., 2016;
Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018), on age, because previous work suggests a
positive effect of age on giving (Engel, 2010), and on religiosity, because previous work
suggests that religious primes increase giving (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; Shariff et al., 2016;
but see Gomes & McCullough, 2015).
In the Appendix we report the exact empirical instructions, including the moral identity scale and
the AT-SCI scale.

9

4. Results
4.1. Participants
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT experiments are
simple and inexpensive, because participants play from their own computers or smartphones by
completing an online incentivized survey that takes usually less than ten minutes. This allows
experimenters to significantly decrease the stakes at play, without compromising the results.
Several works have shown that data collected using AMT are of similar quality than those
gathered using the standard laboratory (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand &
Zeckhauser, 2011; Berinski, Huber & Lenz, 2012; Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 2013; Paolacci
& Chandler, 2014). Furthermore, compared to standard experiments, AMT studies use samples
that are more heterogeneous than the standard laboratory samples, which are typically made of
students (Berinski et al., 2012). On the negative side, some studies have highlighted potential
issues with collecting data on AMT, including non-comprehension and, more recently, the
presence of AMT workers using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to participate multiple times in an
experiment; critically, these workers provide exceptionally low quality data (Dennis, Goodson &
Pearson, 2019). To increase data quality, we recruited participants with an AMT approval rate
greater than 95% (AMT keeps track of this information and allows experimenters to filter out
participants accordingly), we asked participants comprehension questions to make sure that they
understood the crucial parts of the experiment (see below for details about the comprehension
questions), and we checked for multiple IP addresses and multiple Turk IDs (in case we find
duplicates, we keep only the first observation, as determined by their starting date).
Participants were located in the US. After providing informed consent, they were presented with
the experimental instructions, followed by two questions testing comprehension. One question
asked which choice by Player A would maximize Player A’s payoff; the other question asked
which choice by Player A would maximize Player B’s payoff. Only participants who correctly
answered both questions were allowed to complete the experiment; the other participants were
automatically excluded. In doing so, we collected a total of 313 player A’s and 311 player B’s
(females = 48%, mean age = 38 years).
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4.2. Mean transfers in response to social information
We begin by looking at whether the type of information regarding Player C’s behaviour (take, do
nothing, or give) impacts Player A’s mean transfer. Results in Table 1 suggests the existence of a
positive trend such that Player A’s mean transfers depend positively on the information received
about the behaviour of Player C. Results of a repeated measures ANOVA confirm this intuition,
by revealing statistically significant differences in mean transfers in response to different
information amounts (F(2, 624) = 5.35, p < 0.005). Results of a Friedman test (the nonparametric equivalent to the repeated measures ANOVA) confirm these findings (p<0.001) 4.

Table 1. Mean Player A transfer by social information (n=313)
Information about
Player C’s transfer
-$0.50

Mean transfer of
Players A
$0.00

Std error

$0

$0.02

0.023

+$0.50

$0.04

0.024

0.024

4.3. Distribution of transfers in response to social information

Next, we explore whether positive, negative or neutral social information impact the distribution
of choices of Players A. Figure 1a shows the distribution of transfer choices (take/neither/give)
by social information for the entire dataset, with each panel representing a different social
information amount. Figure1b shows the distribution only for those players that actually
conditioned their transfer choices in some way to the social information provided. These
represent 20% of the full sample - the other 80% of players did not condition their transfer
choices to the social information provided. As a consequence, the distributions of choices made

4

A more detailed examination of the underlying regression model corresponding to our ANOVA model shows that
only pro-social (‘giving’) information has a positive effect on transfers compared to anti-social (‘taking’)
information (p=0.001). There is no significant difference between the effect of negative and status quo information
on mean transfers (p=0.147). Pairwise comparisons (reported in Online Appendix 2) confirm these findings.
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by Players A tend to be relatively stable when the information regarding Player C’s behaviour
varies (Figure 1a). If we restrict the analysis to those Players A who do change their choice as a
function of Player C’s behaviour, we observe greater variability (Figure1b). Results of a StuartMaxwell test for marginal homogeneity confirm that the distributions in Figures 1a and 1b are
significantly different from each other (p<0.001).5

a. Distribution of Player A’s transfers by information about Player C’s behaviour – all Players
A (n=313)

b. Distribution of Player A’s transfers by information about Player C’s behaviour – only
Players A who change transfer in response to Player C’s behaviour (n=65)

Figure 1. Distributions of transfers made by Players A by social information. Panel a.
reports the full sample of Players A; panel b. reports only those Players A who change their
transfer in response to the social information received about Player C.

5

This result is identical for the full sample and the conditional sample, due to the fact the Stuart-Maxwell test uses
only changing frequencies in the calculation.
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Having established that the distributions of transfers are statistically different from one another,
we now investigate in more detail the impact of each type of information about Player C’s
behaviour on stated transfers made by Players A. To do this, we focus on the subsample of
Players A that actually conditioned their choices on the social information provided (Figure 1b).
Table 2 reports results of McNemar pairwise tests.
Starting from the case in which Players A receive neutral information about the behaviour of
Player C (central panel of Figure 1b), we note that the majority of these Players A (60% of the
conditional subsample) select the same choice, “neither give nor take”, towards Player B;
moreover, the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in response to neutral social
information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in
response to negative (23.1%) and positive (33.9%) social information. This suggests that Players
A tend to conform to neutral information about Player C’s behaviour.

Table 2. McNemar tests of proportions of Player A’s that condition their responses on
social information (n=65). Significance levels: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
Comparison
% Players A taking in response to negative information vs
% Players A taking in response to neutral information
% Players A taking in response to negative information vs
% Players A taking in response to positive information
% Players A doing nothing in response to neutral information vs
% Players A doing nothing in response to negative information
% Players A doing nothing in response to neutral information vs
% Players A doing nothing in response to positive information
% Players A giving in response to positive information vs
% Players A giving in response to negative information
% Players A giving in response to positive information vs
% Players A giving in response to neutral information

Exact McNemar Test
p-value
0.0005***
0.0023***
0.001***
0.0095***
0.1325
0.0113**

Moving now to Players A who receive positive information about the behaviour of Player C
(right panel of Figure 1b), we note that the majority of these players (50.8%) select the same
choice, “give”, towards Player B; moreover, the proportion of Players A selecting this choice in
response to positive information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A selecting
13

this choice in response to neutral information (26.2%), but not significantly higher than the
proportion of Players A selecting the same choice in response to negative information (35.4%).
This suggests that, while Players A tend to conform to positive information, responses to
negative social information are less conforming.
Indeed, looking now at Players A receiving negative information about the behaviour of Player C
(left panel of Figure 1b), we note that this time Players A are more split, as 41.5% decide to take
the $0.50 from the corresponding Player B, while a similar proportion (35.4%) decide to give.
This shows that some Players A conform to negative information, while a non-negligible
proportion of other Players A counter-conform to negative information. Evidence of conformity
is confirmed by the fact that the proportion of Players A exhibiting ‘taking’ behaviour in
response to negative information is significantly higher than the proportion of Players A
exhibiting taking behaviour in response to positive (15.4%) and neutral (13.9%) information. On
the other hand, the proportion of Players A who “give” in response to negative information
(35.4%) is numerically but not statistically greater (McNemar test p=0.2632) than the proportion
of Players A who “give” in response to neutral information (26.2%). This suggests that counterconformity is relatively rare6. We expand on this in the next section.

4.4. Individual heterogeneity and its determinants
Summary statistics reported above suggest that there are different responses to social
information. In this section, we aim to identify precisely the range of individual strategies that
people adopt when responding to social information. To do this, Spearman rank correlation
coefficients were computed for each player. This determines the strength and direction of the
monotonic relationship between variables, and is the approach used in other studies of player
heterogeneity (e.g. Gachter, Gerhards & Nosenzo, 2017; Fischbacher, Gachter & Fehr, 2001).
For individuals whose transfer choices did not vary with social information, we could not
compute Spearman rank correlations. Hence, mean transfer was used to classify these individuals
as ‘unconditional givers’, ‘unconditional takers’ and ‘unconditional status quo’.

6

If counter-conformity were more prevalent, we would have expected significantly higher levels of giving in
response to negative social information compared to neutral or positive social information, as a result of the
reactance of players with strong moral identities in response to socially inappropriate behaviour.
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We thus define six subject ‘types’ based on their behavioural strategies, as follows:


“Conformists”: Players A displaying a (weakly) positive correlation between their
transfer and the information received regarding the transfer made by Player C;



“Counter-conformists”: Players A displaying a (weakly) negative correlation between
their transfer and the information received regarding the transfer made by Player C;



“Unconditional takers”: Players A who take the $0.50 from Player B, regardless of the
information received about Player C’s choice;



“Unconditional givers”: Players A who give the $0.50 to Player B, regardless of the
information received about Player C’s choice;



“Unconditional status quo”: Players A who do nothing, regardless of the information
received about Player C’s choice;



“Others”: Players A who do not belong to any of the previous classes.

Table 3 reports the distribution of types. Results show that about 80% of players did not
condition their choices in response to social information about Player C’s choices. This leaves
only 20.76% of all players that actually conditioned their transfer choices in response to social
information. Of these, about 15% consistently conditioned their behaviour to social information,
most of whom displayed conformist strategies (10.86%). Only 5.43% displayed counterconformist strategies, confirming the earlier suggestion that counter-conformity is a rare
behavioural strategy. The remaining 4.47% did not show consistent behaviour.

Table 3.

Distribution of subject types

Types

Freq.

Percent

Conformist

34

10.86

Counter-conformist

17

5.43

Unconditional taker

86

27.48

Unconditional status quo

72

23.00

Unconditional giver

90

28.75

Other (u- and inverse-u shapes)

14

4.47

Total

313

100

15

To gain insight on the influence of moral identity and sensitivity to social comparison on the
behavioural strategy adopted, we ran multinomial logit regressions, where the dependent variable
is player type and the reference type is “unconditional taker”. The models include key socioeconomic variables (gender, age, and income), religiosity, moral identity (divided into both
subscales)7 and AT-SCI8 (as an indicator of conformity). In addition, we include the value of the
first amount presented to players (recall that Players A’s choices were elicited using the strategy
method, in which social information regarding the potential choices of Players C was presented
sequentially and in random order) to control for possible anchoring effects on the strategy
adopted.
Table 3 summarizes the results. Not surprisingly, those classed as ‘conformists’ tend to score
higher on the AT-SCI scale, compared to those who were classed as unconditional takers,
suggesting that the likelihood of being a ‘conformist’ type increases with individual sensitivity to
social comparison (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). With regards to the moral identity subscales, we
find that a higher score on the internalization subscale increases the likelihood of being an
‘unconditional giver’, which is in line with recent empirical evidence showing that giving in the
dictator game is primarily driven by moral preferences (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin &
Capraro, 2018; Capraro & Vanzo, 2019). Conversely, a higher score on the symbolization
subscale increases the likelihood that players select counter-conformist and, to a lesser extent,
conformist behavioural strategies. This suggests that both conformism and counter-conformism
are primarily driven by a desire to appear moral, rather than by an intrinsic moral identity.
In terms of demographic influences, females are more likely than males to adopt unconditional
status quo strategies compared to unconditional taking strategies (and, to a lesser extent,
unconditional giving strategies). This is partly in line with several meta-analyses showing that
females give, on average, more than males in the dictator game (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016;
Brañas-Garza et al., 2018). Household income and age have only weak or no statistically

We averaged the overall responses to all items and identified within-scale reliabilities using Cronbach’s alpha
which measures internal consistency, with values closer to 1 being more reliable. Our results show high internal
reliability for both the internalization and symbolization scale, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.81 (with mean=6.22 and
sd=0.88)) and 0.90 (mean= 4.01, sd=1.45). The overall within scale reliability was 0.86 (overall mean=5.11 and
sd=0.98). This indicates that our data are internally consistent.
7

8

As with the moral identity scale, we averaged responses over all items (mean 2.40 (sd 0.88)), and assessed withinscale reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, which was 0.89. This shows that our data are internally consistent.
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significant influences on the likelihood of adopting any single strategy. Also, religiosity has no
effect on strategy. This is surprising, because previous research shows that religious primes make
people more pro-social (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; Shariff et al., 2016; but see Gomes &
McCullough, 2015). However, we note that the coefficient of the unconditional givers for
religiosity is the only one to be positive, and also the standard error is relatively small; therefore,
it is possible that we failed to detect a significant effect of religiosity on unconditional giving,
because of insufficient statistical power.
Finally, we find that the first amount presented to Player A using the strategy method (the
‘anchor’), has a weak influence on the likelihood of adopting a counter-conformist, or ‘other’
strategy. This confirms findings in O’Garra and Sisco (2019) that anchors may affect the
behavioural strategy adopted.

Table 4. Multinomial Logit Model of Player Types
Conformist
AT-SCI (“conformity” scale)

0.710**
(0.290)

Counterconformist
0.424
(0.357)

Moral identity (internalization)

0.013
(0.258)

0.285
(0.402)

-0.050
(0.192)

0.987***
(0.255)

-0.116
(0.375)

Moral identity (symbolization)

0.300*
(0.170)

0.544**
(0.231)

0.185
(0.135)

0.126
(0.130)

0.545**
(0.249)

Female

0.669
(0.450)

0.665
(0.586)

0.879**
(0.348)

0.664*
(0.350)

1.244*
(0.638)

Age

0.031*
(0.018)

0.021
(0.025)

0.013
(0.015)

0.026*
(0.015)

0.039
(0.025)

Household income (/1000)

-0.006
(0.006)

-0.013
(0.009)

-0.000
(0.004)

-0.006
(0.005)

-0.008
(0.009)

Religiosity

-0.265
(0.268)
-0.151
(0.601)

-0.345
(0.349)
-1.286*
(0.761)

-0.009
(0.207)
-0.476
(0.427)

0.218
(0.205)
-0.302
(0.418)

-0.258
(0.379)
-1.506*
(0.901)

Anchor: Give

0.389
(0.549)

-0.895
(0.648)

-0.385
(0.409)

-0.388
(0.405)

-0.604
(0.676)

Constant

-4.705**
(1.683)

-5.634**
(2.561)

-1.595
(1.166)

-7.578***
(1.671)

-4.469*
(2.321)

Anchor: Status Quo

Chi2
n
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Unconditional Unconditional
status quo
giver
0.206
-0.101
(0.202)
(0.196)

Other
0.273
(0.366)

95.63***
313
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
We explored how information about the behaviour of a third party affects redistribution
behaviour in a dictator game with a taking option. Compared to previous literature, our design
proposes three main innovations. First, we did not only look at the effect of positive social
information, but also investigated the effect of information about the anti-social behaviour of
others. Second, we used the strategy method to examine how individual participants changed
their choices as a function of the social information received, which allowed us to identify
different behavioural ‘types’, namely: ‘conformists’, ‘anti-conformists’ and unconditional
choosers. Third, we explored the determinants of behavioural types using suitable psychological
scales, specifically, the “moral identity” scale and the “attention to social comparison
information” scale. In doing so, our data provided evidence for a number of novel results.
Whilst the majority of participants (80%) were not affected by social information, about 15% of
the participants consistently conditioned their behaviour to the information received; among
these, about 10% conformed, and about 5% counter-conformed to the behaviour of a third party.
The remaining 5% did not show consistent behaviour. The investigation of heterogeneous
individual strategies also revealed some interesting patterns: individuals classed as
‘unconditional givers’ were more likely to have strongly internalized moral identities (as per the
‘internalization’ dimension of the moral identity scale). On the other hand, individuals classed as
‘conformists’ as well as those classed as ‘counter-conformists’, were mostly influenced by a
desire to be seen as moral (as measured using the ‘symbolization’ dimension of the moral
identity scale). However, conformists also showed concern for what others think (as measured by
the ‘attention to social comparison’ scale). Thus, our results suggest that social information
mainly affects those who care about being seen to be moral, at least in what regards
redistribution choices. The direction of effect however depends on how sensitive one is to what
others think.
These results confirm and go beyond previous literature in several dimensions. In the Related
Literature section, we reviewed studies finding that participants who receive positive social
information tend to conform. We replicated this finding, and also showed that, when participants
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receive negative social information (i.e. information about a third-party taking money from
recipients in a dictator game), some of them conformed to this negative behaviour, but others
counter-conformed. The finding that some participants adopt counter-conformist behaviour in
response to negative social information, is, to the best of our knowledge, new, although it relates
to the recent line of evidence that people with strong moral convictions exhibit counterconformist attitudes and intentions in response to information that goes against their prior moral
and political beliefs (Hornsey, Smith & Begg, 2007; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2012; FurthMatzkin & Sunstein, 2017).
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to explore the personality determinants of
conformity and counter-conformity, at least in the domain of giving and taking behaviour. We
found that, in our context, both conformity and counter-conformity were driven by a desire to be
seen as moral. This result can be useful in terms of applications. Future work could test whether
moral salience can increase people’s conformity to positive behaviours and people’s reactance to
negative behaviours. However, we also found that conformity was also driven by a sensitivity to
what others think. Future work could test whether individuals who are sensitive to social
comparison respond equally to social information provided by in-group members and social
information provided by out-group members. If explicitly faced with information about the
behaviour of out-group members, might these individuals change their behavioural strategy from
conformist to counter-conformist? This research can contribute to the emerging stream of
literature using moral suasion to encourage pro-social behaviours (Brañas-Garza, 2007; Ferraro
& Miranda, 2013; Dal Bó & Dal Bó, 2014; Bonan, Cattaneo, d’Adda & Tavoni, 2019; Bott,
Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, in press; Capraro et al., in press).
Finally, our results also confirm previous work showing that giving is partly driven by moral
preferences for doing the right thing (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018; Capraro
& Vanzo, 2019). We add to this line of research by highlighting that moral preferences may not
just increase giving, but indeed may do so in contexts where other people are observed to do
quite the opposite.
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